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NATURE OF THE CASE
This was an action by plaintiffs for specific
performance of real estate contract for two residential lots
or for damages against the defendant-third-party plaintiff
who interpleaded against third-party defendants for damages,
and the latter claim no obligation to provide said lots.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The third-party defendant, L. A. Campbell, seeks
reversal of the judgment as against L. A. Campbell.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs are daughters of B. 0. Brough, deceased.
The decedent's estate, on December 16, 1970, .contracted by
Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit A) to sell 22 acres of
land at $3,000 per acre to Barton Brothers Investment Corporation.

The agreement further provided that:
"Buyer shall have the option of buying or
refusing to buy the acreage west of the oil
pipe line except that seller shall have the
option of retaining one lot west of said pipeline, to be adjusted in said payment due June
1, 1975."

The June l, 1975 payment was to be the balance due under the
contract.

By Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated

June 7, 1974 (Exhibit 1) Barton agreed to sell to Campbell
property situated "east of Center Street, Kaysville, Utah, for
$8,500 per acre for approximately 36 acres-50 acres to be
determined by survey", payable $100 down and the balance on
delivery of deed on or before July 1, 1974, and no exceptions
or reservations were mentioned in Exhibit 1.
On July 29, 1974, Barton as seller contracted with
plaintiffs (Brough daughters) by Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase (Exhibit B) to sell property described as
"2 lots to be chosen in Grand Oaks East
subdivision to be recorded by Kaysville City.
A part of the B. 0. Brough estate. Pick of
lots to be done within 10 days after recording."
The purchase price was stated to be $5,000 payable $1.00 down
and the balance of $4,999 due 30 days after completion of
- 2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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offsite improvements in the subdivision immediately adjacent
to said lots on the "base of $2,500 per lot".
A warranty deed from the Brough estate signed also by
plaintiffs as granters to Barton Brothers Investment Corporation
as grantee, dated July 15, 1974, was recorded July 30, 1974,
(Exhibit 4).

This warranty deed described the same 22 acres

as set forth in the 1970 contract, Exhibit A, but made no
exceptions, limitations or reservations.
Barton, by warranty deed dated July 18, 1974,
recorded July 30, 1974, conveyed the same 22 acres to Golden
West Development, Inc., again without any reservations or
qualifications (Exhibit 3).

L.A. Campbell was a principal

stockholder in Golden West along with Wayne Parkin and John
Duncan.

Golden West caused the 22 acre plat to be platted

as "Grand Oaks, Plat A" in Fruit Heights City, Davis County,
Utah, which was recorded June 24, 1976.
James H. Brough, a brother of the plaintiffs, is a
owner-broker of Brough Realty in Kaysville, Utah, and testified
that he notified Barton of his deceased father's desire to have
his sisters obtain lots in the Brough property, and that Jim
drew up the Earnest Money Agreement on July 29, 1974, at the
time of closing the Brough estate contract with Barton, in
the presence of Gordon Gurr, Barton, and his sister, Vilate
(Tr 12).

Jim said that at closing $2,000 was credited to Barton

for the two lots his sisters were to get, calculated as 2/3 of
an acre at $3,000 per acre (Tr 14).

Brough did not know of any

sale by Barton to Golden West until after April, 1976 (Tr 15),
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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when he saw a preliminary plat of the property.

The plat,

(Exhibit E) shows a preparation date of January 1976; owner's
dedication May 27, 1976, by Golden West Development, Inc., by
L. S. Campbell and Wayne F. Parkin; a city council of Fruit
Heights City approved June 1, 1976; and a recording on June
24, 1976.

Jim testified that within about three to four weeks

after April 23, 1976, he had conversations with Campbell and
Parkin (Tr 16) and was informed by Parkin that the latter
claimed no obligation to furnish the two lots; whereupon
Brough called Barton and was advised that there was a misunderstanding and that Barton would see that those lots were
delivered.

Brough also claimed that his sisters had selected

Lots 9 and 10 and were so marked in Brough's

office and

communicated verbally to Campbell and Parkin by Brough's agent.
However, he acknowledged that Parkin said that Lot 9 was
already sold.

This brings in a conflict as to the time Brough

made a selection in that Parkin's records showed that Lot 9
was sold February 8, 1977 (Tr 126) so the conversation with
Brough was after February 8, 1977, in which event the Broughs
did not make a selection within ten days after the recording
date of June 24, 1976.

Brough said that in his intital con-

versations with Campbell, his impression was that:
"At least there was hope of honor. I don't know I
would say yes, we are honoring that, I'm not conveying that. He seemed to be aware of the transaction, some of the background to it, and gave me
hope that yes, he was working with us." (Tr 29)

- 4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Brough said he did not have reason to believe otherwise until
Wayne Parkin called.

Brough admitted that he never personally

advised Parkin (whose Secure Realty was handling the lots) that
the two lots had been sold, but only indicated this on Brough's
own chart in Brough's office.
Brough also admitted that Lots 9 and 10 in the
recorded plat are situated east of the pipeline, whereas Brough
intended "to pick west of the pipeline" (Tr 35).
of the pipeline is in Kaysville City (Tr

~6),

The land west

the land east of

the pipeline was in the county until annexed by Fruit Heights
and Brough assumed that the plat Brough's were interested in
would be recorded by Kaysville City (Tr 38).

Brough had

indicated that in April 1976 he had marked Lots 9 and 10 on a
copy of a subdivision plat marked Exhibit D, but when it was
called to his attention that Exhibit D was signed by the city on
June 1, 1976, Brough hedged that it may have been another plat
which he could not locate (Tr 46).

Brough also admitted on

cross-examination that he did not know whether his first conversation with Campbell was before or after June 1, 1976 (Tr 47),
and that his first conversation with Parkin was when Parkin
told Brough that Lot 9 had already been sold (Tr 49).
Erough testified that the $5,000 for the two lots
was never tendered "because the lots were sold prior to the,
to that date of tendering".
a tender.

The plaintiffs' complaint alleges

Attorney Rodney Page, by letter dated February 4,

- 5 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1977, to Barton advises Barton of the selection of Lots 9 and
10, and that Brough had been trying to work the matter out with
Campbell but was unable to resolve the matter (Exhibit F).

Page

commenced suit on October 12, 1977, against one defendant, Barton
Brothers Investment Corporation.

On February 27, 1978, Barton

moved to bring in Golden West and Campbell as third-party
defendants.

The Third-Party Complaint alleges:

"5. Defendant and third-party plaintiff
purchased the twenty-three acres above mentioned
in 1970 and at that time agreed to permit -· Violate
B. McDonald and Evelyn Brough, plaintiffs herein,
to select two lots from said twenty-three acres
upon the subdivision of the tract. A Uniform Real
Estate Contract provided that the plaintiffs would
pay defendant and third-party plaintiff the same
price tendered by defendant and third-party
plaintiff for equivalent ground in the 1970
transaction.
6. Third-party defendant, L. A. Campbell,
was informed by Jay Golden Barton of the aforementioned agreement, permitting the plaintiffs to
select two lots from the twenty three acre tract.
7. At the closing of the purchase of the
said twenty-three acres by the third-party defendants, L. A. Campbell acknowledged the aforementioned
agreement between the plaintiffs and defendant and
third-party plaintiff as part of the entire purchase
and further agreed that the Uniform Real Estate
Contract referred to above, would be assumed and
honored by the third-party defendants.
8. In connection with the closing, the thirdparty defendants withheld payment to defendant and
third-party plaintiff on one acre of the twentythree acre tract in order to assure clearance of
the original owners. Such payment remains untendered
and in escrow at the Farmers State Bank at Woods
Cross, Davis County, Utah.
9. Third-Party defendants have subsequently
developed and sold most, if not all, of the ground
within the twenty-three acres.
10. Third-party defendants have failed to
provide two lots for the plaintiffs as agreed in
the Uniform Real Estate Contract originally entered
into by defendant and third-party plaintiff and
subsequently assumed by the third-party defendants.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Said actions of the third-party defendants were
intentional and fraudulent on the part of the
defendant and third-party plaintiff and as a
result thereof said third-party defendants should
be liable for court costs, attorneys' fees and
punitive damages sustained by said defendant and
third-party plaintiff."
Golden West and Campbell answered the third-party complaint by
denying the above allegations except Paragraph 9, and alleged
as an affirmative defense that the claim was barred by the statute
of frauds contained in Title 25, Chapter 5, Section l.
The trial court made an open court ruling, the
initial part of which is as follows:

(Tr 183-185)

COURT'S RULING
"THE COURT: As to the defendant, Golden West
Development, Inc., one of the third-party defendants,
the Court finds no cause of action. I find nothing
that would bring them into this. It's a separate
entity, though maybe Mr. Campbell's ultra-ego. That
certainly hasn't been broughtout here and I find no
cause of action against Golden West Development, Inc.
The Court has wide latitude. We have from
the spring of '76 until the spring of '77, as to when
the notice came out. I can just flip a coin and find
out when this notice went out, I guess, that's how
far apart the testimony is.
The Court thinks it's more reasonable to
believe that the finding of the plat in it's preparation and the sale as uncontested by Mr. Brough,
that it was sometime in the spring of "76, is the more
reasonable date and the Court finds that notice was
given at that date.
There seems to be a feeling that the plaintiffs
should have gone and completed their performance before
it was able to do so. The completion of the project,
the off-site improvements as testified to in the fall
of "77 as I recall.
The Court finds a Judgment against the defendant,
J. Golden Barton -- no, the Barton Brothers Investment
Company, and order specific performance. If that is

- 7 -
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not possible, and I understand it is not but I
think that's an alternative that the Court must do,
then the Court finds the damages in the sum of
$22,900. That's the only figures before me. Plus,
$1,450.00 attorney's fees and costs of the court.
The Court finds that the actions of the
plaintiff were with due diligence, and was reasonable. That the law would not expect them to offer
the $5,000 to the owners of the property when they
had been informed that he absolutely wasn't going to
convey it. The testimony, and it's not refuted, was
that they stood ready, willing and able to pay that
at any time.
The Court has a more difficult time with Mr.
Campbell. Mr. Campbell's own testimony was that he
knew of the agreement, he entered into an agreement,
and indicated that sometime down the line they would
take care of it, indicating to the Court that he
felt he had a responsibility. He knew of the agreement, and then the question rises, does this take
it out of the Statute of Frauds. The Statute of
Frauds, of course, indicating that the land must,
any contract dealing with land, must be in writing
unless it falls within one of the exceptions.
The Court does find that this does fall in
one of the exceptions, that Mr. Campbell does have
a responsibility in that the agreement that he
entered into and testified to as did Mr. Barton,
took place prior to the granting of the deed and
with discussions thereafter. The Court takes to
mean that they would take care of it somewhere down
the line, meant that the Broughs would receive that
which they have contracted to receive and find for
the plaintiffs and against the defendant, L. A.
Campbell, the sum of $22,900 in damages, $1,450.00
attorneys' fees and costs of court.
The Broughs might understand they are not
to get that twice, that's to be as between Mr.
Campbell and Mr. Barton, the defendant Barton
Brothers Investment Corporation."
Formal Findings of Fact were subsequently filed,
which recited that the Barton-Brough transaction was closed on
July 29, 1974 at which time Barton gave plaintiffs the choice of
two lots to be chosen within ten days of recording of the plat

- 8 -
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which was recorded in "the spring of 1976" and plaintiffs gave
notice to Barton of the selection "in the spring of 1976"; that
plaintiffs were ready and willing at all times to pay $5,000 for
improvements on the lots which were completed in the fall of
1977; that the lots in 1976 were selling for $13,950 each; that
Barton sold the land to third-party defendant in July 1974,
subject to the contractual rights of plaintiffs to select two
lots as provided in the contract, which was dated December 16,
1970; that at the time of closing between Barton and Golden West
the sum of $8,500 belonging to Barton was retained in escrow;
that Campbell verbally agreed with Barton to provide plaintiffs
with two lots called for in the contract dated December 16, 1970;
and that although the Campbell agreement was "verbal in nature,
the Court finds that Barton Brothers Investment Corporation fully
performed their obligations under the verbal agreement, which
performance constitutes an exception to the Statute of Frauds,
which requires that contracts for sale of real property be in
writing."
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs
against Barton, ordering Barton to forthwith convey the two lots
to plaintiffs who are to pay $2,500.00 per lot for improvements,
or in the alternative for judgment against Barton for $27,900
less $5,000 for improvements, and similarly judgment was entered
against Campbell to convey the lots or to pay Barton $27,900
less $5,000.

The $8,500 in escrow was ordered returned to Barton

- 9 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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unless Campbell paid the judgment in which event Campbell woulJ
get the $8,500.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE IS NOT
AVAILABLE IN AN ACTION AT LAW FOR
MONETARY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF AN ORAL
CONTRACT TO CONVEY LAND.
Appellant contends there was no oral contract by

him to convey the two lots, but assuming the existence of an
oral agreement which was otherwise sufficiently definite and
certain to be enforceable in an equitable action of specific
performance for conveyance of land because of part performance
by the obligee, nevertheless, part performance is not available
in the alternative remedy for damages.
In Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P2d 570
(1953), Justice Wolfe in an opinion which reversed the trial
court's judgment for specific performance, added under conrrnents

13 and 14:
"The second count in the complaint is an action
at law for money damages; however, plaintiff cannot
obtain relief on that basis. It is well settled in
this jurisdiction that the doctrine of part performance is not available in an action for damages on an
oral contract to convey land. Baugh v. Darley, 112
Utah 1, 184 P2d 335."
This holding was reaffirmed in the case of McKinnon v. Corporation, Etc., Latter-Day Saints, 529 P2d 434 (Utah 1974).

In this

trial court's oral opinion, he stated that he ordered specific
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performance against Barton but,
"If that is not possible, and I understand it is
not but I think that's an alternative that the Court
must do, then the Court finds the damages in the sum
of $22,900." (Tr 184, lines 15-18)
Then as to Campbell the Court stated that the transaction was an
exception to the Statute of Frauds and "find for the plaintiffs
and against the defendant, L. A. Campbell, the sum of $22,900 in
damages, $1, 450 attorney's fees and costs of the Court."

(Tr 185,

Line 12-14)
The written judgment in Paragraph 1 orders specific
performance by Barton and payment by plaintiffs of $2,500 per
lot; Paragraph 2 is an "alternate judgment" against Barton for
$27,900 less $5,000 and $1,450 attorney's fees against Barton
and Campbell; Paragraph 3 is a judgment for Barton against
Campbell for specific performance upon payment of $2,500 per lot;
and Paragraph 4 "in the alternative, awards Barton judgment
against Campbell for $27,900 less $5,000 and for costs.
It is clear that the "alternate" judgment is for
money damages for breach of an oral agreement to convey land and
is not permissible.
The pleadings did not allege an equitable action.
Plaintiffs complaint named only Barton as defendant, and recited
an agreement of July 29, 1974, whereby Barton agreed to convey the
lots, that the plaintiffs have tendered $4,999 and defendant failed
and refused to provide said lots as agreed.

The prayer of the

Complaint was:

- 11 -
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complaint was:
"l. For an Order of the Court requiring the
defendants to provide to the plaintiffs the lots
as agreed in the agreement.
2. In the alternative for judgment against
the defendants in an amount equal to the present
value of the lots in question, together with
interest thereon at the legal rate."
The prayer thus requests equitable relief in No. 1 and legal
relief in No. 2.

However, the third party complaint which is

detailed supra pages 6 and 7 contains no equitable allegations
and in fact in Paragraph 10 alleges that the failure of Golden
West and Campbell to provide two lots for plaintiff was intentional and fraudulent "and as a result thereof said third-party
defendants should be liable for court costs, attorneys' fees and
punitive damages sustained by said defendant and third-party
plaintiff".

The complaint did not call for punitive damages

against Barton, so it is assumed that the third-party complaint
really intended that Campbell be liable for punitive damages and
not "punitive damages sustained" by Barton as alleged.

The

prayer of the third-party complaint was for (1) what plaintiffs
may recover from Barton;

(2)

the sum of $5,000 as "the value of

one acre for which payment was initially withheld;
sum of $10,000as punitive damages, and (4)

(3)

for the

for cost of court and

attorney's fees.
Also, the judgment granting plaintiffs money damages
against Campbell was improper for the reasons above stated and
for further reason that plaintiffs prayed no relief against
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Campbell who in fact was not a party to the Complaint and had
no dealings with plaintiffs.
POINT II
THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE AS
EXCLUDING THE OPERATION OF THE STATUTE
OF FRAUDS IS EXTREMELY LIMITED.
We quote from Ravarino v. Price, supra, connnents
6, 7 and 8:
"The doctrine is to be applied with great care, paying
particular attention to the policy expressed in the
statute of frauds and historical precedent where the
limits have been defined by the process of inclusion
and exclusion. In Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P.
767, 772, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 870, this court said:
'Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine
invoked by plain tiff, have not, by any means:,
intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only
to prevent its being made the means of perpetrating
a fraud. In order that a plaintiff may be permitted to give evidence of a contract not in writing,
and which is in the very teeth of the statute and
a nullity at law, it is essential that he establish
[in equity], by clear and positive proof, acts and
things done in pursuance and on account thereof,
exclusively referable thereto, and which take it
out of the operation of the statute.
And in Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 135
N.E. 273, 274, the Court of Appeals of New York,
through Mr. Justice Cardozo announced: 'The peril
of perjury and error is latent in the spoken promise.
Such, at least, is the warning of the statute, the
estimate of policy that finds expression in its
mandate. Equity, in assuming what is in substance
a dispensing power, does not treat the statute as
irrelevant, nor ignore the warning altogether. It
declines to act on words, though the legal remedy
is imperfect, unless the words are confirmed and
illuminated by deeds. ' . . . .
[7] A careful analysis of the cases will aid
in defining what constitutes part performance in
the framework of the facts of the instant case. The
act relied upon by plaintiff to invoke the doctrine
is the purchase of a strip of land to be used as a
1

- 13 -
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railroad spur in conjunction with the land which
Mr. Price orally promised to convey. The doctrine,
in its broadest scope, is that acts will constitute
sufficient part performance if they are clearly
referable to some contract existing between the
parties, in relation to the subject matter in
dispute, and as a result of these acts, the
plaintiff has been defrauded. . . . A less liberal
view is that the term 'part performance' is to be
taken literally, and the performance must be something required in the identical contract.
This doctrine has found little support because
many of the strongest cases, those where improvements
have been erected on the land by a plaintiff in
possession, do not involve any part performance at
all, literally speaking. . . . It is also essential
that the parol agreement or gift should be established by clear, unequivocal and definite testimony,
and the acts claimed to be done thereunder, should
be equally clear and definite and referable
exclusively to the contract or gift.
[8-10] It is to be noted that possession by
the plaintiff is regarded as an important fact,
one which is generally directly referable to the
contract, and when combined with permanent and
valuable improvements which are representative
of the existence of an oral contract, virtually
every jurisdiction will grant specific performance."
The written Findings of Fact with respect to the
alleged oral contract are contained in Paragraphs 16 and 17
thereof as follows:
"16. That the defendant Campbell verbally agreed
with Barton Brothers Investment Corporation to provide
plaintiffs with the two lots called for in the contract
dated December 16, 1970, provided plaintiffs made their
selection and paid the monies called for therein.
17. That although the agreement between Barton
Brothers Investment Corporation and Campbell was
verbal in nature, the Court finds that Barton
Brothers Investment Corporation fully performed their
obligations under the verbal agreement, which performance constitutes an exception to the Statute of
Frauds, which requires that contracts for the sale of
property be in writing."
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The said "Findings of Fact" are more characteristic of conclusions of law.

It is to be noted that the said findings and the

third-party complaint both ref er to the contract dated December
16, 1970, which was the Uniform Real Estate Contract, Exhibit A,
between the Brough Estate (including plaintiffs) as seller and
Barton Brothers Investment Corporation.

The 1970 agreement gave

Barton the option to buy acreage west of the pipeline, and gave
Brough the "option of retaining one lot west of said pipeline,
to be adjusted in said payment due June 1, 1975".

Plaintiffs

complaint was for two lots pursuant to the July 29, 1974 agreement, Exhibit B, from a named subdivision in Grand Oaks East
Subdivision in Kaysville City.

Golden West developed the property

east of the pipeline under the name of Grand Oaks subdivision, and
plaintiffs claimed to have selected Lots 9 and 10 thereof which
were east of the pipeline and in Fruit Heights, not Kaysville City.
Campbell's agreement with Barton, Exhibit 1, dated
June 7, 1974, makes no exceptions or references to any other
agreements and obligates Barton to furnish good and marketable
title.

Barton did not contract directly with plaintiffs until

July 29, 1974.

By warranty deed dated July 18, 1974, recorded

July 30, 1974, Barton deeded the 22 acres to Golden West without
any restrictions or reservations.
The trial court's oral opinion relating to the oral
agreement and its effect stated:

(Tr 184-185)

"The Court has a more difficult time with Mr.
Campbell. Mr. Campbell's own testimony was that
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he knew of the agreement, he entered into an
agreement, and indicated that sometime down the
line they would take care of it, indicating to
the Court that he felt that he had a responsibility. He knew of the agreement, and then the
question rises, does this take it out of the
Statute of Frauds. The Statute of Frauds, of
course, indicating that the land must, any contract
dealing with land, must be in writing unless it falls
within one of the exceptions.
The Court does find that this does fall in one of
the exceptions, that Mr. Campbell does have a
responsibility in that the agreement that he entered
into and testified to as did Mr. Barton, took place
prior to the granting of the deed and with discussions thereafter. The Court takes to mean that they
would take care of it somewhere down the line, meant
that the Broughs would receive that which they have
contracted to receive and find for the plaintiffs and
against the defendant, L. A. Campbell, the sum of
$22,900 in damages, $1,450.00 attorney's fees and
costs of the court."
Thus neither the formal findings which were conclusions regarding
an

entirely different agreement dated December 16, 1970, or the

courts oral opinion point to any clear oral agreement, but on
the contrary indicate a confusion even as to the general nature
of the oral agreement.

Barton testified that his agreement with

Campbell about the lots for the Brough girls was prior to closing
date of August 18 and after his July 29, 1974 agreement with
Brough (Tr 89-90).

In which event he was already obligated to

give Campbell clear title under the June 7, 1974 agreement and
had in fact deeded the land free and clear by deed dated July 18,
1974, recorded July 30, 1974.

Barton's only performance was

what he was obligated by written contract to perform.

The trial

court, during Barton's testimony, also expressed his concern
over the Statute of Frauds and part performance as follows:
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"THE COURT: The difficulty I have here, Mr.
Smedley, is where is the part performance? I'm,
I haven't seen anv documents. The documents
apparently refer ~ot at all to this two-way agreement or innuendoes.
MR. SMEDLEY: Well the part performance is by
deed in that we had property that was under contract
to Mr. Barton. By deed -- he transferred all of his
interest to Mr. Campbell. Campbell now has the
property and as a result of our performance, totally,
we are now entitled to explain what the agreement was
between the parties in that regard.
THE COURT: I have a tough time getting that out
of the Statute of Frauds. The conveyance of the
property would not, and if you have some law on that
I would be glad to have that. Just the deeding of
property would not do that.
MR. SMEDLEY: I think that it would, Your Honor,
because I think the deeding of the property is the
performance.
THE COURT: In order to get it out of the Statute
of Frauds, Mr. Smedley, don't you have to have some
indicia of an agreement, and we are talking about an
agreement of conveying the property to some thirdparty in the case of you and Mr. Fadel's client. It's
not even an agreement as between the two of you, but
to be conveyed for the benefit of some third party who
is in a previous agreement situation with your client.
MR. SMEDLEY: Well, I don't know.
THE COURT: Don't you have to have some indication
that there is an agreement?"
Nothing in the subsequent testimony, admitted over
objection of counsel, appeared to answer the concerns expressed
by the trial court as quoted above.

In fact, the Court again

(Tr 94) asked Barton's counsel how he could get around the Statute
of Frauds' stating:
"THE COURT: Well, in other words, we have got to
have something that ties it down. Checks, notes,
memoranda, something with signatures on it to indicate
an acknowledgment, as I understand the Statute of
Frauds before that can be brought out.
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MR. SMEDLEY: Well, I don't know that it has to
be anything with signatures on.
THE COURT: What would prevent me from putting up
any kind of a document there is and saying here is
a document and this says such and such, and no
signatures, no acknowledgment, or no nothing?"
Then at (Tr 106) the Court stated that the document
did not appear to be ambiquous as as to allow parole evidence in
view of the Statute of Frauds.
Campbell was called to testify by Barton and testified
in substance that before he bought the property he

mad~

an agree-

ment with Barton "that down the road I was going to make an agreement to take care of the two lots" (Tr 136).

However, the

agreement as to two lots did not arise until July 29, 1974, as
reviewed in the statement of facts, so the discussion as to the
two lots would have been after July 29, 1974.

And while Campbell

may not have been clear as to the time, he was clear that the only
agreement with respect to the Brough lots was that it would have
to "be worked out", but it was never mentioned how it would be
worked out (Tr 137).

Campbell said it was up to Barton to negotiate

with Golden West to buy the lots for the Brough sisters and Barton
never did (Tr 141).

Barton was recalled by his counsel.

Appellant

objected to any oral testimony that went beyond explanation of
negotiations and contended that the Statute of Frauds is substantive,
not just procedural (Tr 151-152).

Over objections of appellant,

the Court allowed Barton to testify.

Barton said that "in the

preliminary closing meeting" at Farmers State Bank, August 30th,
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he met Campbell (Tr 153) and told him that Barton had exercised
his option with Brough for the land west of the pipeline, and
that the girls were to select two lots_ and Barton escrowed
$8,500 to cover the cost of the ground (Tr 154).

When asked

what, if any, comment did Mr. Campbell make in this regard, Barton
answers:

"He said that he understood that it was, he said

that because of the necessity of exercising the option on the
ground west of the pipeline he would honor that agreement"(Tr 154
line

27-2~).

Appellant moved to strike the Barton testimony which
was denied by the Court.

It is to be noted that Barton had

already made a deal with Brough in exercising his option and
granting the sisters the right to select two lots before asking
Campbell to honor the agreement, but after Campbell had acquired
the property by Earnest Money Agreement June 7, 1974, and deed
recorded July 30, 1974.

However, on cross-examination, Barton

changed the date of his conversation with Campbell from August
30th to July 30th (Tr 156).

Later, as shown by testimony at

(Tr 166-167) Barton said the only reason for the July 29, 1974
agreement with the sisters was to satisfy his obligation under
the 1970 Uniform Real Estate Contract, and when asked if Campbell
had ever committed himself in writing to any reservations or
exceptions, Barton replied:
had."

(Tr 166 line 19).

"At the closing, he felt that he

But Barton contended this would have

been July 30 even though the unsigned closing statement, Exhibit 2
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is dated August 18, 1974.

When asked why he didn't demand a

written agreement from Campbell the same as Brough required on
July 29, 1974, Barton replied that he felt that the escrow agent
"would pass that on in title insurance or in title information
to Mr. Campbell, and that that would serve as the instrument of
agreement, that the title record would do that, on the title
insurance" (Tr 167 lines 3-8).
Even allowing the oral testimony, it is clear that
at most, Campbell indicated verbally, after he bought the
property and had no obligation with respect to the said lots,
that he would work something out down the road.
Nothing reviewed in this point or known to be in the
transcript shows anything like a part performance or any performance by Barton relating to an alleged oral agreement by
Campbell to convey two lots to Broughs.

Bartons only performance

was fulfilling his legal obligations under his written contract
with Campbell for which Barton was paid in full.

This court,

in Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P2d 1319, under Comment
7, stated:
"[7] Plaintiff also claims, in the alternative,
that the oral agreement is removed from the statute
of frauds due to the equitable principle of part
performance, which is part of our law by statute,
and decision-. The observations just made pertaining
to oral modification also apply here. The payments
referred to could well be regarded as payments on
the written contract and they do not unequivocally
relate to any oral contract."

- 20 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III
ASSUMING THAT CAMPBELL ORALLY PROMISED TO
DEED LOTS TO PLAINTIFFS, THIS PROMISE WAS
WITHOUT CONSIDERATION AND IS NOT AN
ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT APART FROM THE STATUTES
OF FRAUD.
Viewing Barton's testimony most favorably, any oral
agreement, whatever its terms, came on or after July 30, 1974,
"at the closing".
18, 1974.

The unsigned closing statement was dated August

Barton was already obligated as of June 7, 1974, to

convey the land.

Any promise by Campbell to deliver two lots to

be "chosen" by plaintiffs was without consideration.

Campbell

received nothing for such an alleged promise.

An analysis of the transaction related by Barton
reveals that Broughs lost no money, Barton gained profit, and
Campbell would have lost money.

Broughs had already retained

$3,000 from Barton for one acre of land, whether to adjust for
survey deficiencies or otherwise.

Barton was selling to Campbell

over 22 acres at $8,500 per acre which Barton bought in 1970
for $3,000 per acre.

Barton's purported escrow with the bank of

$8,500 for one acre to cover the Brough selection amounts to
giving Broughs the right to buy back their choice of a developed
22 acres at Campbell's average cost of $8,500 per acre.
a loss to Campbell in many ways.

This is

It is common knowledge that

although a larger tract of 22 acres might be purchased at $8,500
per acre, yet to buy just one acre even before development would
conrrnand a much greater price.

If Campbell's actual cost of
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improvements were estimated to be $2,500 per lot, and he was
required to sell them to Broughs just for the cost of improvements and his actual average cost of the raw ground, he would
get nothing for his effort in getting the land annexed, subdivided and improved, would lose money on his actual cost of the
selected acreage, and would have carried the expense of his
investment from August 18, 1974 until late 1977 without any
interest renumeration or gain, all for the benefit of Broughs
and/or Barton, to whom he owed nothing.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFFS MADE NO TENDER STATING THAT
THE LOTS WERE SOLD PRIOR TO DATE OF
TENDERING, WHICH INDICATES THAT THE
ACTION IS ONE AT LAW FOR DAMAGES, NOT
IN EQUITY FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Although the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint
that plaintiffs "have tendered the $4,999 as provided" in the
agreement of July 29, 1974, no tender was ever made.

James

Brough testified that he had not tendered any money to Barton
(Tr 22 line 11) and that the reason for not tendering was
"because the lots were sold prior to the, to that date of tendering."

(Tr 24 line 28).

The written findings of the court merely

stated that:
"11. That plaintiffs were willing and ready,
at all times, to pay the Five Thousand ($5,000)
for the improvement on said lots upon conveyance."
This Court held in the case of Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt,
538 P2d 1319 (1975) that:
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"A tender requires that there be a bona
fide, unconditional, offer of payment of the
amount of money due, coupled with an actual
production of the money or its equivalent."
A letter from plaintiff's attorney to Barton dated- February ·4, 1977
(Exhibit F) requests that Lots 9 and 10 be made available but
makes no offer of payment.

The street improvements were completed

by the fall of 1977 (Tr 184) and the action was connnenced against
Barton on October 12, 1977, yet no tender was ever made to Barton,
Campbell or Golden West.
Tender of payment and the conveyance are to occur
simultaneously and are regarded as mutual and concurrent acts.
One party cannot hold the other in default until he has himself
properly tendered performance.

(77 AmJur 2nd, Vendor and

Purchaser 665).
Assuming that tender was excused by Brough's belief
that the lots were sold to others, this shows that Brough never
intended to obtain specific performance and the action was a legal
action for damages which as above reviewed would preclude the
claim of part performance as a basis for such legal action.
POINT V
A CONTRACT REQUIRED TO BE IN WRITING
CANNOT BE MODIFIED BY ORAL AGREEMENT
OR UNSIGNED DOCUMENTS.
The judgment against Campbell cannot be supported
upon any claimed oral agreement which would tend to alter the
written agreements and the deed between Barton and Campbell.
Under the written agreement, June 7, 1974, and the warranty deed
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July 18, 1974, no obligations to Broughs were assumed by
Campbell.
This Court held in Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt
(supra) that notations on a check were insufficient, and stated:
"This, plaintiff argues, is a sufficient memorandum
in writing to modify the original contract and
satisfy the statute of frauds. It is elementary that
when a contract is required to be in writing, the
same requirement applies with equal force to any
alteration or modification thereof. More importantly here, any such modifying agreement must be
sufficiently certain and unequivocal in its terms
that the parties will understand what it is and what
is to be done under it. Neither the check, nor the
quoted notation thereon, make any such recitals and
they do not meet that requirement.''
CONCLUSION
Campbell at no time agreed in writing to convey lots
to Broughs nor was there any part performance on the part of
Barton, Brough or otherwise which would support an oral agreement
if one had been unequivocally proved.

Campbell has not profited

whereas Barton will have profited by his failure to perform.
Broughs

have a claim and judgment against Barton for $2,000

allowed him on the purchase price, plus damages for loss of
anticipated bargain.
The judgment should be reversed as to appellant,
L. A. Campbell.
Respectfully submitted,
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